

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)
Colonel B. R. Brown, USA(ACSI)
Captain H. W. McElwain, USN (ONI)
Colonel F. J. Cole, USAF (AFCIN 2D3)
Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (J-2, The Joint Staff)
[redacted] Director of Operational Services, NSA
[redacted] Defense (OSO)

50X1

50X1

SUBJECT: NIE 36-61: NASSER AND THE FUTURE OF ARAB
NATIONALISM

1. Attached are Terms of Reference for subject estimate. It is proposed that this estimate will supersede the previously planned NIE 36-61: "Prospects for the Arab World." These terms therefore take the place of those issued on 7 February.

2. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by close of business 1 June. We propose no representative's meeting on these terms unless it is requested by one of the agencies.

Chester L. Cooper
CHESTER L. COOPER
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

DISTRIBUTION D

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

13 April 1961

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 36-61: NASSER AND THE FUTURE
OF ARAB NATIONALISM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable trends in the Arab Nationalist movement generally and to assess the likely policies and prospects of Nasser and the UAR in particular.

NOTE

This estimate, the scheduling of which was approved by the USIB on 4 April, is being undertaken at the request of the White House staff for completion in August. Since much of the subject matter will be the same as that envisaged for the previously scheduled NIE 36-61, "Prospects in the Arab World," this estimate will take the place of the one planned earlier. The requirement is for an estimate providing intelligence support for policy studies concerning Nasser and Arab nationalism and US relations

SECRET

SECRET

thereto. Obviously, many of the major questions incorporated in the terms of reference approved for the earlier version of this paper are relevant to the current requirement. Obviously too, some of the material called for in the previous Terms of Reference is no longer needed. The accompanying draft terms of reference are designed to stand on their own, without reference to the previous terms, and they supersede the latter.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. RADICALS VERSUS CONSERVATIVES IN THE ARAB WORLD

A. Nasser as leader and symbol of the radical nationalist movement. How his problems, objectives, and prospects have changed over the last two years in the light of:

1. The UAR's internal problems and outlook.
2. Developments in other Arab states.
3. Events in Africa, Algeria, the UN, etc.
4. The developing policies of the Soviet Bloc and the West.

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

B. Extent to which the radicals will retain the initiative
in the Arab world:

1. The nature of their pressures against the remaining conservative governments.
2. Prospects and policies of the conservatives in the light of these pressures.
3. Chances of significant splits in or reverses for Nasser's Pan-Arab nationalist movement -- e.g., a loosening or breakup of the UAR.
4. Possibility of other more radical nationalist leaders or groups succeeding in becoming significant rivals of Nasser. Their possible points of difference with him.

C. Arab Unity:

1. Kinds of possible unity. Chances of progress towards unity in the light of country nationalisms and conflicting interests. Status and prospects of the Arab League. Likely trends in the Cairo-Baghdad rivalry. Its effects on other states.

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS

(N.B. To focus largely on UAR problems, though with attention to other states where important to the problem.)

A. General economic prospects -- bright spots and problems.

The oil industry (borrow from NIE 30-60). Likely role and effects of foreign aid from the West and the Bloc. Possibility of moves toward economic unity.

B. Social trends -- manner and degree to which the Arab states are moving out of traditional patterns in social life and the effect of this on their economic and political prospects. Role of the military, the intelligentsia, other important groups. Role and influence of indigenous Communist parties.

III. ARAB RELATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

A. The basic postulates of Nasser's foreign policy. How have these changed over the years, and how are they likely to change.

B. Probable trends in Nasser's foreign policies:

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

1. The Arab-Israeli question (Israel's nuclear program, Jordan waters controversy, etc.).
 2. Africa.
 3. The East-West conflict (how Nasser views the great powers; how he is affected by their policies; extent to which his "positive neutralism" can and will remain truly neutral; how his policies toward the West and the Bloc are affected by local problems).
 4. Likely attitude in matters affecting the UN organization and structure.
- C. Significant Arab variations from Nasser's foreign policy:
1. Outlook for the pro-West policies of the conservatives.
 2. The peculiar role of Iraq.
- D. Western and Neutralist Influences in the Arab World:
1. Likely trends in UAR policies toward the West; issues on which Nasser and the West will clash; can cooperate. Effects of Western relations with other Arab governments.

- 5 -

SECRET

SECRET

2. Relations of Nasser and other Arabs with the
neutralists.

E. The Soviet role. Likely policies of the Bloc toward
Nasser? Other Arab states and Israel? Soviet relations
with local Communist elements?

IV. VALIDITY STUDY OF NIE 30-59, "Main Currents in the Arab
World." How well has the general analysis in this estimate
stood up? Chief deficiencies?

- 6 -

SECRET